Except, but Do Not Exclude: What ABS Marine Does to the Excepted-Matters Doctrine
Abstract
The Supreme Court’s judgment in M/s ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration (2026) [ “ABS Marine”] held that a finality clause can bar arbitration over the quantification of an already admitted or undisputed liability, but not over the existence of that liability itself. The decision has been viewed as pro-arbitration because it does not allow the government to act as judge in its own cause. This article argues that its more significant implication may lie elsewhere. ABS Marine appears to shift the excepted-matters inquiry from a question of scope to one of validity. The older cases asked what the parties had agreed to keep out of arbitration. ABS Marine invites a different question: what the law permits them to exclude at all, a question that belongs to Section 28 of the Contract Act. This article asks what remains of the doctrine’s founding case, Vishwanath Sood v. Union of India (1989) [ “Vishwanath Sood”], once that shift is taken seriously.
I. Introduction
The ruling by the Supreme Court in ABS Marine has been viewed as a significant victory for arbitration. The government had unilaterally recovered a disputed amount by enforcing a clause it had drafted, but the Court held that the government could not act as judge over its own case. Most of the discussion on the ruling has focused on three points: the principle against a party judging its own cause, rule that a clause cannot leave a party without any remedy, and the bearing of Section 28 of the Contract Act [ “Section 28”].
Additionally, the author argues that the ruling also results in another consequence. The question under the doctrine of excepted matters changed from the one relating to whether the parties agreed to exclude matters from arbitration to whether a provision that excludes any reference to the court and to arbitration is valid at all. The implication is that the consequences of this ruling fall under the ambit of contract law according to Section 28, rather than arbitration law. The argument that follows seeks to prove this point by reading ABS Marine against the authorities that the case did not cite, particularly Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd v. Motorola [ “Motorola”], where a similar issue was addressed earlier.
II. The Decision in Brief
The issue resulted from the manning contract signed by ABS Marine and the Andaman and Nicobar Administration. Two clauses were instrumental in the case. According to Clause 3.20, the Administration had the right to assess whether the contractor was in default and recover its loss. According to Clause 3.22, any dispute concerning the contract was to go to arbitration (para. 19). After the Administration recovered a substantial sum by its own calculation of damages, the arbitrator decided in favour of the contractor. The award was not overturned by the District Judge, however, it was cancelled by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The Supreme Court restored the award (para. 44).
The court relied on two different lines of reasoning, and the distinction between them is significant. The first pertains to the interpretation of Clause 3.20, which is to be interpreted as excluding only the measurement of damage when liability is established, but not the prior question of whether liability exists at all, which is disputed in the present case (paras. 35, 37). The second reasoning goes beyond the contract. A clause which does not allow the court or the arbitrator to act, the court pointed out, would leave the aggrieved party without any forum at all, which offends the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (para. 30). The court then gave that objection a statutory footing. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code confers jurisdiction on civil courts over all suits of a civil nature. Section 28 voids agreements that absolutely restrain a party from enforcing its rights, while Exception 1 saves agreements to refer disputes to arbitration (para. 31). Read together, the two provisions permit one forum to be substituted for another, they do not permit every forum to be removed. From this the Court drew the rule that no construction should be adopted which leaves a vacuum in legal remedies (para. 32), and the conclusion that a matter may be excepted from arbitration though justice cannot be excluded altogether (para. 38)., However, the court did not declare the clause void, rather, it interpreted it narrowly so as not to have to resolve this question (para. 36). Although the interpretation argument settled the case, the second line of reasoning is likely to prove more important, as will be shown below.
III. The Doctrine Before ABS Marine
Cases that deal with exceptions are often referred to as if they form one single rule. They do not. Taken together, they ask different questions and express different views on the point that ABS Marine presents as the focus of concern: whether there must be some remedy regardless of the exception.
This history starts before the doctrine itself. In State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills (1987) [ “Rameshwara Rice Mills”], the Court held that a party cannot determine for itself whether it has committed a breach, it can decide only the question of damages, and only where the breach is admitted or not contested (paras. 7–8).
Vishwanath Sood is usually treated as the starting point of the doctrine, and it repays a closer look. A clause allowed the Superintending Engineer to fix the compensation payable for the contractor’s delay, capped at ten per cent, and made his decision final. The Court held this an excepted matter for two reasons: the arbitration clause opened with words to the effect of “except where otherwise provided in the contract,” which, as a matter of construction, took the compensation question out of the reference, and the Engineer’s power was not undefined, being confined to that capped compensation, with the Court careful to add that claims for loss or damage under the general law remained open. The Court did not say the exception was valid because a remedy survived. That reading came later, in Motorola, and is open to challenge.
General Manager Northern Railways & Anr v. Sarvesh Chopra [“Sarvesh Chopra”] took the opposite approach and according to the Court the excepted matter can exist even if there is no internal mechanism for resolving it in the contract and the case has been distinguished from Vishwanath Sood for arriving at such a conclusion (paras. 9, 17). The position has resulted in severing the connection between an excepted matter and the existence of a remedy.
Motorola held two conclusions. First, it found that a clause by which the buyer’s determination of damages was made final and irrevocable did not exclude any dispute, as there was no adjudicative mechanism for determining the antecedent issue of breach (paras. 23, 26). On this issue, Motorola and Sarvesh Chopra appear to pull in different directions: the former treats the absence of machinery as fatal, the latter as irrelevant. Motorola distinguishes Sarvesh Chopra as a “no-claim” case. There the contractor had given up the right to claim for breach at all, so the claim was extinguished rather than merely excepted, and no machinery was needed to adjudicate what no longer existed. Clause 16.2, by contrast, neither supplied machinery nor extinguished the claim. The distinction holds on its own terms, but it is uneasy: if an exception is justified by a surviving remedy, the no-claim clause leaves even less than the finality clause does. Second, and this is the aspect often missed in later commentaries, Motorola confirmed that the provision preventing any challenge to the quantification was void under Section 28 as being a restriction on legal proceedings (para. 38). Hence, the issue of a surviving remedy was already an issue of its legality, and not just of its scope, seventeen years before ABS Marine.
The case of J.G. Engineers v. Union of India (2011) [ “J.G. Engineers”] explained once again the distinction between liability and quantum: from the standpoint of a finality clause, only quantum is covered, but who committed the breach is an issue that has to be decided by a court or tribunal (paras. 18–19). The case followed the decision in Motorola but based the rule on the principle that no one can be a judge in one’s own cause instead of on the provisions of Section 28.
By 2026, these cases formed a sequence rather than a principle. Across two statutory regimes, the 1940 Act and the 1996 Act, they agreed only that some matters could be kept out of arbitration. They never settled whether an exception is good only where a remedy survives or not. Motorola alone had tied that question to Section 28, and no later decision picked the point up.
IV. From Scope to Validity
On a narrow reading, ABS Marine adds little. The Court interpreted Clause 3.20 to except only the quantification of admitted liability, applied Rameshwara Rice Mills and J.G. Engineers, and restored the award. That interpretation decided the appeal by itself. Because the Court read the clause as leaving the contractor’s remedy intact, it had no need to decide whether the clause was valid, and it declined to do so (paras. 36–37). Everything said after that point was therefore unnecessary to the outcome. It is also the part that matters the most.
The significance lies in the change in the question before the Court. The older cases were concerned about what the parties had agreed to exclude, the scope of their consent and consequentially, the scope of the arbitration agreement. ABS Marine further asks whether a clause that shuts out both arbitration and the court has any effect at all. As the Court put it, “‘Except’ matters one may but ‘Exclude’ justice, one cannot” (para. 38). That question concerns the validity of the particular clause and belongs to the field of contract law rather than arbitration law.
The difference between liability and quantum is where the shift does its work. If no provision could deprive a party of its remedy, then typically a dispute over liability is not allowed to be classified as a valid excepted matter, since this would allow one party to determine whether the obligation exists at all and not provide any means of challenging it. Such an arrangement would permit a party to determine its own rights or obligations without any meaningful challenge. ABS Marine strongly indicates that this is not permissible. Only the quantification of admitted liability can be excepted, because then a remedy has already been conceded.
In this light, the decision fills the gap the earlier cases left: an exception can be valid only if some remedy survives it. This explains Motorola, where the clause left no machinery in place. It limits Sarvesh Chopra, whose tolerance of exceptions without machinery can hold only so long as some remedy remains. But it makes Vishwanath Sood difficult to place.
Here it is necessary to be careful, because the novelty of this shift may be less than it appears. Section 28 had already entered this area in Motorola, where the clause was held void citing that provision (para. 38). So, ABS Marine did not discover the point, it changed its role. In Motorola, Section 28 struck down one clause on one hand, while arbitrability was analysed separately through the absence of machinery on the other, the two lines were never joined. In ABS Marine, the combination of both means that the analysis must move from clause-by-clause to a broader analysis regarding the validity of the exception. The common law did something of a similar nature long ago. In Scott v. Avery (1856), it was held that the parties could make the award a condition precedent before commencing a legal action, whereas in Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co. (1922), it was concluded that the parties could not oust the courts’ jurisdiction entirely. Thus, already at that time, a distinction between the lawful ‘except’ and the unlawful ‘exclude’ was made. In this sense, Section 28 is its statutory embodiment. What ABS Marine did was not to discover this principle, but to bring the excepted-matters inquiry under it.
V. The Difficulties: Scope, Validity, and Vishwanath Sood
Three difficulties qualify the argument.
First, scope and validity are two distinct questions. The scope is concerned with what the parties did not take to arbitration and is dependent on the wording of that agreement. On the other hand, validity is concerned with what the law permits any party to exclude at all, and it will be the same for everyone irrespective of how the agreement is worded. Relocating the doctrine to Section 28, therefore, changes the question instead of simply clarifying it, and two consequences follow. The doctrine loses its footing in consent: a clause may now fail for reasons unconnected to what the parties intended, and drafting can no longer settle what is excepted. More awkwardly, the question of who decides becomes live. A dispute about scope is ordinarily for the tribunal, a dispute about whether a term is void is not so plainly its own. That was the High Court’s objection in ABS Marine, that the arbitrator, being a creature of the agreement, could not pronounce on the clause’s validity (para. 13), and the Supreme Court did not answer it, construing the clause narrowly instead (para 36.).
Second, there is a factor of doubt regarding the validity of the Section 28 reasoning being part of the ratio. The Court decided the appeal based on interpretation and left open the question of the clause’s validity (paras. 35–36). If the reason is part of the ratio, it becomes binding, if it is obiter, it will still have an influential effect on subsequent courts, but they would not need to follow it rigidly.
The most difficult of the three cases is Vishwanath Sood. In this instance, the Superintending Engineer, who was one of the persons involved in the contract, was granted powers to fix the compensation amount, which depended on the contractor’s own default, and this is close to the very thing the Rameshwara Rice Mills and ABS Marine line says a party may not do. The exception survived because the court treated the Engineer’s powers as limited and confined, and read the clause narrowly so that it applied only to the compensation claim. The problem is thus, not only that in Vishwanath Sood there was a narrowly limited remedy. It is that the judgment seems to allow for some kind of one-sided adjudication that in the eyes of contemporary courts is undesirable. Since the validity of an exception is nowadays established through the existence of a remedy, it is unclear whether the exception can pass the test developed by ABS Marine. ABS Marine neither cites Vishwanath Sood nor explains how it relates to the case. The case has not been overruled, the tension is simply left open, and this article does no more than to point it out.
The lesson for those drafting government contracts is a bit limited but still valid and applicable. After ABS Marine, a blanket finality clause has a real risk. To be of any use, such a clause should be limited to the quantification of admitted liability, and the issue of liability itself should remain open to arbitration and the courts.
VI. Conclusion: What Survives the Exception
ABS Marine will be remembered for encapsulating the important takeaways, including the fact that arbitration has triumphed, the State cannot be the final judge in its own alleged wrongdoing, and the clause closing all forums for legal recourse cannot survive. There is nothing wrong with any of this. The more subdued effect of the ruling, however, could be lasting. At the same time as stating the obvious proposition that contractual clauses cannot deprive parties of their remedy options, ABS Marine may mark the beginning of a shift in the excepted-matters doctrine. On one reading, the doctrine is no longer concerned only with identifying what the parties agreed to exclude from arbitration, the growing focus has shifted to determining what the law permits them to exclude.
It remains to be seen if courts will follow that reasoning, but one case clearly marks the boundary. What Vishwanath Sood allowed may not satisfy the principle ABS Marine implies. When the time comes for a later Bench to choose whether it wants to reconcile the two cases, distinguish between them, or simply ignore the earlier case, that is when the contours of the doctrine will become clear.





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