CHINA’S GLOBAL MEDIATION INITIATIVE: CAN INDIA AFFORD TO SIT OUT?

On 30 May 2025, China hosted a signing ceremony in Hong Kong, where 33 countries, including Pakistan, Indonesia, Belarus, and Cuba, signed the Convention on the Establishment of the International Organisation for Mediation [“IOMed”]. The IOMed is the world’s first intergovernmental legal body devoted exclusively to mediation. However, it has not yet commenced its operation. It will come into force only once three countries ratify it, as per Article 60(1) of the IOMed, which also provides that it shall enter into force on the 30^th day after the deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi touted it as a body meant to transcend “zero-sum” thinking in dispute resolution and combine the very best of major legal systems to make mediation more flexible, cost-effective, and efficient. Officially, its major objective is to fill a long-standing institutional gap in the international mediation field. Unlike arbitration and litigation, which have established forums such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [“ICSID”] and the International Court of Justice [“ICJ”], mediation lacks a standing intergovernmental body to coordinate cross-border efforts or support state-to-state mediation in a structured manner. The IOMed seeks to address this by offering a neutral, rules-based forum for international mediation, thereby promoting predictability, fairness, and cooperation in global dispute resolution.

Existing international disputes tribunals are widely seen by non-Western jurisdictions as biased toward the West. For instance, the majority of ICSID arbitrators come from a narrow pool of countries, typically the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and parts of continental Western Europe. Representation from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Global South remains disproportionately low (see ICSID Caseload Statistics 2017–2, p. 19). A Chinese commentary notes that the IOMed is intended to correct this imbalance and give the Global South a larger voice in peaceful conflict settlement. It remains to be seen whether India, given its status as a developing nation and its growing preference for Alternative Dispute Resolution [“ADR”] mechanisms, will choose to sign and ratify the Convention.

I. How is IOMed different from existing mediation-arbitration [“med-arb”] frameworks?

The IOMed Convention (if not accessible, please see here) establishes the IOMed as an intergovernmental organisation with international legal personality (Article 6) and privileges/immunities (Chapter X), similar to those of the United Nations [“UN”] and ICSID. Unlike the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [“New York Convention”] and the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation [“Singapore Convention”], which focus solely on the enforceability of arbitral awards and mediated settlement agreements [“MSAs”] respectively, and do not establish any standing international organisation, the IOMed Convention goes further by creating a permanent institutional framework (Article 1) to support international mediation.

The ICSID Convention has 165 signatories, and the Singapore Convention has been signed by 58 states. Notably, the 37 signatories so far to the IOMed Convention are from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and not from Europe or North America, highlighting its Global South orientation. Its headquarters are in Hong Kong (Article 8), with the option to open regional offices elsewhere. The Convention envisages a Governing Council (Chapter II) and Secretariat (Chapter III), akin to other treaty-based tribunals, such as the ICSID’s Administrative Council. The detailed State-to-State Mediation Rules, Investment and Commercial Mediation Rules, Rules on Fees and Costs, and a Mediator Code of Conduct have also been recently made available.

The IOMed is deliberately structured to complement, not replace, existing dispute resolution mechanisms. Article 38 of the IOMed underscores this by expressly allowing mediation to be initiated at any time, regardless of whether other dispute settlement proceedings are already underway, and even to run concurrently if the parties agree to it. It further permits the suspension of limitation periods during mediation, subject to applicable law, thereby encouraging parties to explore resolution without procedural disadvantage. Mediation under the IOMed remains without prejudice to the parties’ rights to pursue other available remedies.

All mediation under the IOMed is explicitly voluntary (Article 24), which implies that the parties must consent to mediate, and any settlement they reach does not become enforceable without their agreement. It explicitly covers three types of cases: inter-state disputes, investor-State disputes, and international commercial disputes between private parties. This is much broader than the ICSID Convention, which only deals with investor–State disputes, or the Singapore Convention, which only covers private commercial settlement agreements.

In practical terms, the IOMed simply offers an additional voluntary forum to bring parties, including States, to the mediation table. Article 40 of the IOMed provides that any settlement agreement duly concluded between the parties is binding and shall be performed in good faith. It also clarifies that by signing such an agreement, the parties acknowledge it as a product of mediation, allowing it to be relied upon for seeking relief under applicable law. Article 41 takes this further by stating that MSAs reached in international commercial disputes may be enforced by a Contracting State in accordance with its domestic legal framework. It also calls for a Protocol to be negotiated to lay down the specific conditions under which such enforcement will take place. This protocol, however, is yet to be finalized, and its contours remain unclear. While referrals may certainly arise from commercial mediations, the success of the IOMed will depend significantly on how many States choose to engage with and refer disputes to it. State participation not only ensures a wider enforcement network but also lends credibility and institutional weight, much like the role of State consent in establishing the legitimacy of ICSID. Ultimately, the IOMed’s ability to carve out its space will hinge on both the strength of its forthcoming enforcement protocol and the willingness of States to ratify and operationalize it.

Until then, for private parties that are signatories to the Singapore Convention, enforcement may still be sought under that framework. However, this is conditional upon ratification of the Singapore Convention by the relevant States and is limited to the types of disputes and parties covered under that Convention. While the IOMed framework presumes good-faith compliance with settlement terms, the ultimate utility and credibility of the IOMed as an enforcement mechanism will only be tested once the Protocol is negotiated and enters into force.

II. India’s dilemma: To join or not?

So far, India has not made any publicly reported official statement or remark concerning the IOMed. Historically, India has been cautious about ratifying or joining international dispute-resolution bodies. For instance, India has refused to sign the Rome Statute of the ICC, citing sovereignty concerns. It has likewise not signed the ICSID Convention. In 2000, the Indian Council for Arbitration explicitly recommended against ICSID membership, warning that its arbitration rules leaned towards developed countries and offered no avenue for an Indian court to review an award even if it violates India’s public policy. Instead, India has preferred to resolve investment disputes through bilateral investment treaties [“BITs”], relying on institutions such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration [“PCA”] and incorporating protective provisions in its Model BITs.

Similarly, while India has signed the Singapore Convention, it has yet to ratify it. Experts have highlighted that India's current legal framework still falls short in enabling the cross-border enforceability of MSAs. Although the Mediation Act, 2023 [“Act”] recognises and enforces domestically concluded MSAs, it does not offer a clear framework for enforcing foreign or cross-border MSAs. Section 13 of the Act takes a progressive step by permitting mediation to be conducted outside India or online, and extends enforceability, registration, and challenge mechanisms to such settlements. However, there remains a lack of clarity regarding the enforcement of cross-border MSAs.

In light of the above, India’s approach to the IOMed is likely to be influenced by similar considerations of sovereignty and reluctance at the policy level. That said, India also has strong reasons to support and contribute to the growth of global mediation, particularly in light of its overburdened judiciary and the potential of negotiated settlements to preserve both relationships and resources. On the legislative front, India enacted the Mediation Act to boost institutional mediation domestically. Following its enactment in June 2024, the Ministry of Finance urged all government departments, entities, and agencies to adopt mediation under the Act and/or pursue amicable settlements for resolving disputes. Indian business and legal experts have also generally welcomed faster dispute resolution, with a growing trend of solving insolvency, corporate, and family disputes via mediation.

India’s judiciary has also consistently championed ADR, with its former Chief Justice, Sanjiv Khanna, describing mediation as the preferred mode for dispute resolution over courtroom litigation, as it offers creative solutions and can mend relationships. This judicial endorsement is now being matched by institutional momentum. On May 3, 2025, the Mediation Association of India [“MAI”], a private initiative backed by senior judges, government officials, and legal experts, was launched at the First National Mediation Conference in New Delhi. The event, attended by President Droupadi Murmu, the then Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, the Union Law Minister, and the Attorney General, marked a significant milestone in India’s mediation landscape. President Murmu emphasized the need to extend mediation to the grassroots level, particularly through panchayats, to ease the burden on courts and strengthen community-based dispute resolution. Although the MAI currently operates as a private body, official recognition is reportedly in the pipeline. It is expected to play a key role in developing standards, training frameworks, and institutional mechanisms aligned with the Act. These developments signal that India is moving towards a more structured and proactive mediation culture, one that may, in due course, create space for engaging with international frameworks like the IOMed.

Having said this, India’s hesitation in joining the IOMed may stem less from doubts about mediation itself and more from regional dynamics. India has long aspired to position itself as a global leader in dispute resolution, evidenced by recent institutional efforts such as the establishment of the India International Arbitration Centre (IIAC) and public statements endorsing India as an emerging ADR hub. In this context, some in the Indian legal community may view joining a new global mediation body led by a neighbouring country as a missed opportunity that India could have spearheaded itself. Aligning with the IOMed at this stage might be seen as conceding strategic leadership in shaping the future of cross-border mediation in Asia. Yet, as a trading nation with expanding global investments and economic engagements, India stands to gain from any framework that facilitates smoother cross-border deals and dispute resolution.

Beyond these considerations, geopolitics will play an important role in this decision. The IOMed is widely seen as a Chinese-led Global-South initiative. For India, which is simultaneously forming counter-partnerships with Western democracies like the European Union, the United States, and the Quad, while also seeking a leadership role among developing countries – endorsing a China-originated forum appears highly unlikely. Domestic sentiment is also a crucial factor. Any move towards the IOMed might prompt debate in India about sovereignty, echoing past concerns about treaties like the Rome Statute. Some may also worry about entanglement with China’s agenda, given longstanding border disputes and regional rivalry. Ultimately, India is likely to weigh the legal benefits of having access to an international forum aligned with its preferred negotiation style, against the political costs of appearing to align with China.

However, if India chooses to sit this one out, the long-term consequences could be significant. India has not yet ratified the Singapore Convention, and missing the IOMed could signal reluctance to commit to international mediation standards. For foreign investors, this raises concerns about the enforceability of contracts and overall ease of doing business, as no clear, working mechanism for the enforcement of cross-border MSAs is in force within the country. Arbitration and litigation in India are often lengthy and unpredictable, and without credible international alternatives, investor confidence may erode. In today’s competitive investment landscape, countries offering more efficient and reliable dispute-resolution frameworks stand to gain more capital inflow.

As the World Bank notes, “enhancing the efficiency of the judicial system can improve the business climate, foster innovation, attract foreign direct investment and secure tax revenues.”

If India misses the opportunity to shape and engage with IOMed now, it may lose ground to regional peers who are quicker to adopt and influence such platforms.

III. Conclusion

While the IOMed promises a new platform for settling disputes through dialogue, India’s decision to join would turn on both legal considerations and strategic calculations. It will hinge on a key question: “Will IOMed address the “gap” in access to justice for Indian stakeholders, or is it merely an untested instrument of Chinese diplomacy?” 

Given India’s recent reservation toward similar treaties, it may well choose to wait and see how the IOMed develops, how many countries ratify it, what the yet-to-be-drafted mediation rules by the Governing Council entail, and whether the institution gains legitimacy.

Given the recent diplomatic warmth, especially Prime Minister Modi’s visit to China for the SCO Summit and his talks with President Xi, India might also consider signing the IOMed Convention as a gesture of cooperation. Doing so could show its willingness to engage in dialogue, test China’s seriousness about the platform, and ensure that India has a say in shaping how the institution works.